Negotiable Instruments -- Adoption of Printed Seal by Breckenridge, M. S.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 25 | Number 4 Article 11
6-1-1947
Negotiable Instruments -- Adoption of Printed Seal
M. S. Breckenridge
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
M. S. Breckenridge, Negotiable Instruments -- Adoption of Printed Seal, 25 N.C. L. Rev. 510 (1947).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol25/iss4/11
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
oped a broader view, stating: "When Congress has spoken on this sub-
ject [what is a public purpose] its decision is entitled to deference until
it is shown to involve an impossibility. Any departure from this judicial
restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and what is not a
governmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis
of their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice
which has proved impracticable in other fields.""14
NoEL R. S. WOODHOUSE.
Negotiable Instruments-Adoption of Printed Seal
Suit was brought on a "note or bond" set out in detail in the com-
plaint with the usual allegations of demand and non-payment.1 The
copy of the note disclosed the printed word "Seal" at the right of de-
fendant maker's signature but there was no recital such as "Witness
my hand and seal." 2 The answer admitted execution of the instrument
set out in the complaint and pleaded the statute of limitations, "Said notes
not bearing the seal of ... defendants and were more than three years
past due prior to the bringing of this action."3 The trial judge excluded
defendant's evidence that he neither sealed the note nor understood the
significance of nor adopted the printed word as his seal.4 He also de-
clined to submit any issue on the question of defendant's intent to adopt
the word as his seal.5 Moreover in his charge to the jury the judge
referred to the instrument as a bond.6
Thus hedged in and his instrument judicially classified against him,
the defendant lost at trial and on appeal claimed the rulings and charge
of the trial judge to have been error. That, if erroneous, they had been
prejudicial could not be doubted.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in affirming said that after
defendant had admitted. executing the instruments set out by plaintiff it
would violate the parol evidence rule to admit evidence that they were
in city] was not only novel . . . and that the precedent thus set, if followed to any
extent, would not serve the public interest. But these are nwt matters which are
confided to this branch of the government.").
" United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U. S. 546
(1946) (case related to taking of land in Swain County, N. C., by the T. V. A.).
But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reed.
IBell v. Chadwick, N. C. Super. Ct., May term, Craven County, 1946.
2Id. Fall term, 1946, North Carolina Supreme Court, record on appeal, p. 3.
It seems to be settled that the recital when present will conclusively establish the
adoption of the printed word Seal. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209
N. C. 174, 176, 183 S. E. 606, 607 (1936), semble. Cf. Churchill v. Speight's
Extrs., 3 N. C. 338 (1805).
'Record, pp. 7, 8. As to the .necessity of pleading the facts see Murray v.
Barden, 132 N. C. 136, 43 S. E. 600 (1903) and other cases in N. C. DIGEST,






not sealed instruments: "The allegation and admission establish the
word 'Seal' as a part of each instrument."7
To one who has in mind what we were told in Jefferson Standard
Life Insurance Co. v. Morehead,8 i.e., that "The [parol evidence] rule
... is not violated... by showing that an instrument apparently under
seal is a simple contract," the first thought is that defendant slipped up
in his pleading; he should have denied that he executed a sealed instru-
ment as alleged and then added his specific plea of non-adoption and
the statute of limitations. Nothing can be learned, of course, from the
Morehead case as to correct defense pleading to avoid the parol evi-
dence pitfall since the judicial pronouncement there was dictum and no
such state of facts was involved.
But in Williams v. Turner,9 the case which first in recent years
brought this question into prominence, the trial judge's seventh finding
of fact recited that defendant admitted the execution of a note identical
in all material respects with that in the instant case and yet he was per-
mitted to assert his non-adoption of the printed word and to win on
the short statute of limitations. And in Currin v. Currin the court said,
"The defendant admitted the execution, which admission carries with it
amongst other things, the burden of showing that he had not adopted
the seal."' 0 No doubt the defendant in the principal case would assert
that this was exactly what he was trying to do, i.e., carry the burden
with the evidence he wanted to introduce after he had admitted the
execution but that the trial judge would not let him do it. If the
Supreme Court here had been so inclined they could have treated his
answer as sufficient denial of the execution of a sealed instrument to
have permitted him to testify as to non-adoption of the printed seal -if
non-adoption could serve him as a valid defense. Considering that
defendant admitted the execution of the instrument set out but followed
it in another paragraph by a denial that he comprehended or adopted the
seal, the plaintiff was certainly on sufficient notice that defendant was
not intending to admit that the instrument he signed was a sealed instru-
ment. Obviously he only intended admitting that he put his name to the
form set out; and the legal status of that form as a sealed instrument
depended on his intent-or so we were given to understand from the
earlier decisions.
The truth of the matter seems to be that since the Morehead dictum
we have been inchting along toward a new rule, counsel never having
put their cases in such shape or the facts not being such as to force a
square decision. Thus in one case' after the defendant had "admitted
"Bell v. Chadwick, 226 N. C. 598, 39 S. E. 2d 743 (1946).
'209 N. C. 174, 183 S. E. 606 (1936), Note, 14 N. C. L. REv. 311 (1936).
'208 N. C. 202, 179 S. E. 806 (1935), Note, 14 N. C. L. REv. 80 (1935).
"0 219 N. C. 815, 817, 15 S. E. 2d 279, 281 (1941).
"' Allsbrook v. Walton, 212 N. C. 225, 193 S. E. 151 (1937).
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execution of the note, pleaded that it was not under seal and interposed
by way of defense the three-year statute of limitations," and plaintiff
had offered the note with its printed seal in evidence, defendant de-
murred to the evidence although he had been told by the Morehead dictum
that he must take up the burden of proving non-adoption. He lost.1 2
In another case wherein defendant admitted execution of the note13
and then to sustain the burden of proving non-adoption, testified to
nothing more than that he could not remember what he had intended,
such "negative testimony" got him nowhere.
In a still later case14 where defendant desired to introduce evidence
of his intent not to.adopt the printed word "Seal," counsel had failed
to plead its non-adoption and so had failed to put the issue into the
case. "The absence of allegata is as fatal as the absence of probata."'5
Other recent cases16 of notes bearing "Seals" fall equally short of
putting squarely to the court the ultimate issue, which may be stated
in two ways: (1) As a matter of substantive law, does an intent, dis-
closed or undisclosed, not to adopt the printed word "Seal" leave the
instrument legally a simple contract; (2) if the defendant so pleads as
1 'Correspondingly in Lee v. Chamblee, 223 N. C. 146, 25 S. E. 2d 433
(1943), where the trial judge nonsuited a plaintiff under the three-year statute
(R. p. 6) after the note bearing the printed seal had been introduced, the judg-
ment was reversed and a new trial granted. In that case defendant's pleading did
not exactly admit the execution of the note. He said that after its execution by
his co-maker he "signed said note as accommodation surety," adding a specific
denial of an intent to adopt the printed word "Seal" and a plea of the statute
(R. pp. 4-5).
" Currin v. Currin, 219 N. C. 815, 816, 15 S. E. 2d 279, 281 (1941). Here
he admitted execution of the note at trial rather than in his pleadings. His testi-
mony was only, "I can't say that I intended to show 'Seal"' and "I couldn't say
right now that I remember seeing the word 'seal.'" This presented no question for
the jury.
Roberts v. Grogan, 222 N. C. 30, 21 S. E. 2d 829 (1942).
' He did plead the bar of the three-year statute of limitations which would be
meaningless if he admitted that the instrument was sealed and so if the court had
been disposed to help the defendant it could have treated the plea as fairly raising
the issue of adoption and permitting relevant testimony. Obviously here, as in the
principal case, the court did not want to come to defendant's aid and force itself
to meet the issue discussed herein.
"cIn neither Hertford Banking Co. v. Stokes, 224 N. C. 83, 29 S. E. 2d 24
(1944) nor Perry v. First Citizens' Bk. & Tr. Co., 226 N. C. 667, 40 S. E. 2d
116 (1946) was any point made of the adoption of the word "Seal" and in neither
is it certain that the word was printed. In the latter each note by its own terms
was described both as "note" and "bond." Record, pp. 35-36. In both cases the
respective notes were treated as sealed instruments. The Hertford case went off
on the ground that an indorsement, even if sealed, takes the short statute. It
might perhaps.also have been disposed of on the common law ground that persons
not appearing in sealed and negotiable instruments cannot be charged as parties
thereto. See 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (1914) §§1734-1736; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY,§§151, 152, 186. The Perry case went on the ground that conditional delivery can
be used as a defense (between the parties) to even a sealed note. It does not,
however, sharply distinguish between oral conditions precedent and subsequent, i.e.,
between oral conditions to becoming obligated and to a duty to pay. The case
also further fortifies the view that, though a seal on a note "imports" a considera-
tion, failure of consideration is a defense (between the parties).
[Vol. 25
to avoid admitting the execution of a sealed instrument, is he then
entitled to offer evidence of an intent, disclosed or undisclosed, not to
adopt the printed word as his seal and have the matter passed on by the
jury with a proper instruction. Whichever way the matter is presented
it should receive the same answer. Notwithstanding the pretty strong
past indications to the contrary, I venture to predict that the answer
will be no, at least as to any secret, undisclosed intent. And even as to
a disclosed intent (e.g., maker to payee: "I don't intend this to be a
sealed instrument, you understand." Payee says nothing.) it seems that
the answer should be the same unless defendant's silence in the face of
such statments would be regarded as ground for reformation.' 7
A brief running survey -of the situation then may be helpful partic-
ularly with reference to matters of pleading and proof.
If a plaintiff alleged that the defendant executed a promissory note
to a named payee but said nothing about a seal, he might in some juris-
dictions and in days gone by, have been guilty of a variance when later
he offered in evidence, not a simple promissory note but a sealed instru-
ment-a bill single.' 8  Absent actual prejudice to the defendant from
this technical variance, no such consequence would have befallen the
plaintiff holder in North Carolina, even before the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law.' 9 Yet even here a plaintiff out of caution now and then
recites that the defendant executed his promissory note "or bond."
20
There was once the possibility also that a complaint on a more than
three years overdue simple note would be met by a demurrer on the
ground that the staleness appeared on the face of the complaint. 2' But
that risk no longer faces the plaintiff in North Carolina as the defense of
the statute must be "taken by answer."
22
" This might be predicated either on a mutual mistake of law or on some sort
of fraud by the payee on the maker, matters sufficient for an independent study.
Chadbourn and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9 N. C.
L. REv. 169 at footnotes 60, 63 (1931). See generally, 5 Wn.LlsroN, CoNTRAcTs§§1549, 1581-1586, 1525 (1937). The case for the maker would seem to be
stronger if the printed insignia was "(L. S.)." Mistake of fact, see Malone,
Reformnation of Writings for Mutual Mistake of Fact, 24 GEo. L. J. 613 (1936),
seems .to be out of the question.
28 Reed v. Scott, 30 Ala. 640 (1857) (but amendment was permitted).
"9 Lily v. Baker, 88 N. C. 151 (1883).
'
0 Currin v. Currin, 219 N. C. 815, 15 S. E. 2d 279 (1941), complaint, par. 2.
2 Sturges v. Burton, 8 Oh. St. 215, 220, 72 Am. Dec. 582 (1858). Cf. Hosterman
v. First Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co. of Springfield, - Oh. App. -, 68 N. E. 2d 325(1946); Roy N. DeVault v. Harry S. Truman and another, - Mo. - , 194
S. W. 2d 29, 32 (1946), motion to -dismiss, Pendergast & Kohn for defendant
Truman; Robinson v. Lewis, 45 N. C. 58, 60 (1852), where in equity not even a
demurrer was required and the defense was permitted on hearing. (These are not
promissory note cases.)
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-15 and annotitions; N. C. DIGEST, Limitation
of Actions, §§180, 182(3); Note, 14 N. C. L. Rav. 396 (1936). Similarly else-
where as to motion to dismiss. Woolery v. Smith, 302 Ky. 725, 196 S. W. 2d
115 (1946). Cf. where used by plaintiff against a set-off. Stanly's Extr. v. Green,
1 N. C. 66 (1795). But note Editor's Quaere, 1901 Reprint.
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The problems just discussed, however, are largely academic today
because of the more or less standardized practice 23 of setting out the
note ipsissirnis verbis, thus disclosing the presence of the word "Seal"
after the maker's signature. That is. certainly sufficient for all purposes
and as just noted the defendant must plead the bar of the statute. But
the defendant is advised by the instant case that he had better not in
his answer admit execution of the note thus set forth in the complaint.
Perhaps he should deny the allegations of that paragraph of the com-
plaint "except that he admits that he placed his signature on the printed
form set out in said paragraph of the complaint without adopting but, to
the contrary, with the intent not to adopt as his seal the word 'Seal'
printed thereon but with the intention of executing a simple unsealed
promissory note." To this he might also add, though it would seem to
be a conclusion of law, the allegation that the instrument is not the
sealed promise of the defendant. He would then plead the three-year
statute of limitations.
There seems to be no requirement under our practice that the plain-
tiff reply.24 The cause is then at issue.
At trial, plaintiff would offer the note, prove defendant's signature
(or rely on the admission if, as here assumed, there was one) and any
indorsements necessary to his title.2 5 If the burden of proof consistently
followed the burden of pleading it would now be on defendant to prove
the fact that the statute had run. The burden of proof, however, is other-
wise in North Carolina.26 For rather obvious reasons the plaintiff must
put in evidence and convince the jury that the claim is not barred, as,
e.g., that there was a later promise by defendant which tolled the statute.
Where, however, the question of whether the debt is barred depends not
" See N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-156; 1 DOUGLAS, FORMS (1941), no. 378;
ILL. Civ. PRAc. AcT, Ann. Bar Ass'n Ed. (1933) Apdx. I, 24, no. 19; I WiNsLow,
FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed., 1915), 555, no. 884. Or by adding it
as an exhibit. PEL's FORMS (1912), no. 187; CONN. PRAcTIcE BOOK (1934) 148,
no. 73. Cf. GREGORY'S COMMON LAw FORMS (1927) 34, no. 27; WHITTELSEY,
MIssoURI PRACTICE (1876) 260, no. 44. Nearly all the cases commented on herein
set out the notes in full. Even that style of complaint, however, would not always
show that the word "Seal" was printed as part of a form.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-141; Oldham v. Rieger, 145 N. C. 254, 148 S. E.
548 (1907). Notwithstanding that rule, one case said there may be judgment of
nonsuit on the pleadings where "the statute of limitations having been properly
pleaded it appears from the face of the complaint and the uncontroverted evidence
that'the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by statutory limitation of time." This
sounds as if it denied plaintiffs a hearing on the facts but the court was probably
satisfied from the record that. plaintiffs had nothing more relevant to offer than
something Uncle Samuel had told them. Latham v. Latham, 184 N. C. 55, 113
S. E. 623 (1922). Followed in Jones v. Bankers Life Co., 131 F. 2d 989, 994
(C. C. A. 4th 1942).
" In case of indorsements plaintiff might be a holder in due course in which case
certainly no defense of non-adoption of the word "Seal" should be available.
2 "Incumbent on plaintiff to show." Powers v. Planters Nat. Bk., 219 N. C.
254, 13 S. E. 2d 431 (1941). Contra by rule of court. In rc McKeyes Est., 315
Mich. 369, 24 N. W. 2d 155 (1946).
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on such extraneous matter but on a matter appearing on the face of the
instrument, i.e., the word "Seal" and the intent of the defendant regard-
ing it, the plaintiff has already done enough and the defendant has now
the burden of showing non-adoption.2 7  This it would seem he might
do by showing that he had made marks through the word "Seal. '28
Perhaps he could do it by testimony that when he signed he said to the
payee, "I do not intend this print to be a seal."2 9 From past decisions
we would understand that he could do it also by testimony that, "I then
intended not to adopt the printed word, though I said nothing about my
intent one way or the other," it being for the jury whether to believe
him or not.
The present case does not squarely tell us that such negative intent
is immaterial or that testimony concerning it is inadmissible if the
defendant has not admitted execution of the instrument. If a future
case does tell us those things it will have scrapped a good deal of what
has been said and implied in the past, for it is idle to talk of defendant's
having a burden of proving what he will not be permitted to prove. It
may be that the line will be drawn between offers to prove disclosed
and those to prove undisclosed intent, though it is not easy to see why
the one violates the parol evidence rule more than the other.80  The
rule we have come to or near to is better than the one we had or seemed
to have. A carefully piloted test case is awaited.
M. S. BRECKENRIDGE.
27 Currin v. Currin, 219 N. C. 815, 15 S. E. 2d 279 (1941). Evidently the
burden of convincing the jury not just the burden of going forward. If "Execu-
tion" had meant the same thing in this case as it does in the principal case the court
would never have reached this point. See text at note 10 supra.
2 Though those very marks would be sufficient under present day conditions
to constitute the maker's seal if the jury believe they were put there with that
intent-an unlikely thing when put over the printed word "Seal" but. less unlikely
if the printed matter was "(L. S.)," at least to one who knew exactly what is
meant by that insignia. See 14 N. C. L. -REv. 80, 83, 87, footnotes 12, 31 (1935).
" Here, too, this might be thought more convincing when the print in question
was "(L. S.)."
"0 See I RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §98(1) (1932), and same with Van Hecke,
N. C. Annotations, 13 N. C. L. REv. 1, 67, §98(1) (1934) : "A promisor who de-
livers a written promise to which a seal has been previously affixed or impressed
with apparent reference to his signature, thereby adopts the seal. Comment:
(a) ". . . extrinsic evidence is not admissible." Quoted and followed in Federal
Res. Bk. of Richmond v. Kalin, 81 F. 2d 1003, 1007 (C. C. A. 4th 1936), in-
volving North Carolina instrument. That was before Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64 (1938). While there would seem little room for arguing in the face
of present day practice that the printed word "Seal" was not a seal within the
meaning of this section it would be less clear if the insignia were only "(L. S.)."
See 14 N. C. L. REv. 80, 87 (1935).
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